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THE BASIC LAW AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG
Michael C. Davist

I.

Introduction

Hong Kong's status as a Special Administrative Region of China has placed it
on the foreign policy radar of most countries having relations with China and
interests in Asia. This interest in Hong Kong has encouraged considerable interest in Hong Kong's founding documents and their interpretation. Hong Kong's
constitution, the Hong Kong Basic Law ("Basic Law"), has sparked a number of
debates over democratization and its pace. It is generally understood that greater
democratization will mean greater autonomy and vice versa, less democracy
means more control by Beijing. For this reason there is considerable interest in
the politics of interpreting Hong Kong's Basic Law across the political spectrum
in Hong Kong, in Beijing and in many foreign capitals. This interest is encouraged by appreciation of the fundamental role democratization plays in constitutionalism in any society. The dynamic interactions of local politics and
Beijing and foreign interests produce the politics of constitutionalism in Hong
Kong. Understanding the Hong Kong political reform debate is therefore important to understanding the emerging status of both Hong Kong and China. This
paper considers the politics of constitutional interpretation in Hong Kong and its
relationship to developing democracy and sustaining Hong Kong's highly regarded rule of law.
The high level of popular support for democratic reform in Hong Kong is a
central feature of the challenge Hong Kong poses for China. Popular Hong Kong
values on democracy and human rights have challenged the often undemocratic
stance of the Beijing government and its supporters. The Basic Law has become
the centerpiece of this debate. 1 The Basic Law aims to implement China's "one
country, two systems" formula, first outlined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration,2 whereby Hong Kong is to be allowed a high degree of autonomy in a
separate system from the rest of China. In this formula Hong Kong is promised a
separate system of democracy, human rights and the rule of law within officially
Marxist China. The political reform agenda has been set both by the liberal constitutional content of the Basic Law and support for liberal democracy in the
Hong Kong community. In the past couple years pro-Beijing attacks on democracy and China's interpretation of the Basic Law have sought to displace this
t Michael C. Davis, the J. Landis Martin Visiting Professor of Law at Northwestern University
School of Law, is a professor of law at the Chinese University of Hong.
I Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 4
Apr. 1990, 29 ILM 1511 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
2 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 26 Sept. 1984, 23
ILM 1371 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
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putting the Basic Law and Hong Kong's high deliberal constitutional agenda,
3
gree of autonomy at risk.
In various official interpretations, the Beijing and the Hong Kong governments
have halted any serious efforts at democratic political reform. At the same time,
via these interventionist tactics, they have put the rule of law in Hong Kong
under serious stress. It has become increasingly apparent, as generally appreciated by constitutionalists around the world, that the process of interpretation and
the rule of law form a mutually constitutive relationship with the democratic
component of constitutionalism. As democratic institutional commitments are
expressly provided in both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, it is apparent
that attacks on political reform challenge the very foundation of the "one country,
two systems" model. Will the democracy promised under the "one country, two
systems" formula in Hong Kong be achieved? Does Beijing's constant interference to head off democratization also pose a grave risk to the rule of law and
related stability in Hong Kong?
In the 2004-2005 debate over political reform, Hong Kong arrived at a critical
juncture in its now decades-long constitutional development. The Basic Law
specifies that full democracy can be embraced, after 2007, with elections of both
the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council ("Legco"). 4 Beijing's April
2004 interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law first accepted that
the Basic Law language "subsequent to the year 2007" and "after 2007" encom-5
passed the election of the Chief Executive in 2007, and of the Legco in 2008.
But the text of this same interpretation seized for Beijing the power to decide
unilaterally the pace of democratization. By specifying that the Chief Executive
would be required to issue a report to the Central Government as to the need for
changes, this interpretation put the power to initiate any reform in the hands of
Beijing and its appointed Hong Kong government. The unseemly haste of a series of subsequent reports left little doubt as to the outcome. After the April 20046
interpretation, the specified report from the Chief Executive was quickly issued.
Although the report acknowledged that there was a need for change in the election methods of the Chief Executive and the Legco, the report focused upon
political maturity and offered little hope for substantial democratization.

3

See

4

Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 45, 68, & Annexes I, II.

HONG KONG'S CONSTrTUTIONAL DEBATES

(Johannes Chan & Lison Harris eds., 2005).

5 The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Article 7 of
Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China (Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's
Congress at its Eighth Session on Apr. 6, 2004), L.N. 54 of 2004 of the Hong Kong Gazette, L.S. No. 2
to Gazette Ext. No. 5/2004 reprintedin Chan & Harris, supra note 3) [hereinafter April 6th NPC Standing Committee Interpretation].
6 Report on Whether There is a Need to Amend the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2008, a report of the Chief Executive, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Hong Kong, Apr. 15, 2004 reprintedin Chan & Harris, supra note 3) [hereinafter
Chief Executive's Report].
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Beijing quickly responded to the report with a decision on April 26, 2004
expressly prohibiting expansion of direct elections in 2007 and 2008. 7 In this
decision, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress ("Standing
Committee") specified that the Chief Executive must continue to be selected by
the Election Committee in 2007-although the size of the Election Committee
could be expanded-and that the ratio of directly elected to functional legislators
must be maintained at the same 50-50 ratio for the 2008 Legco election. s This
decision allowed some room for tinkering but effectively halted any serious democratic reform. The October 2006 report from the Hong Kong government called
for the specified reform: doubling the size of the Election Committee to 1600,
with the bulk of such additions coming from members of the District Councils;
and adding five directly elected and five functional seats to Legco, with the functional seats all to be chosen by the District Council members. 9 The democratic
camp's outcry with respect to such token reforms was expected. 10 With a twothirds vote in Legco needed to pass the "reform," (meaning the democrats had
enough votes to block it) the expected Legco rejection came in December 2005.11
Beijing's continuing concerns over democratic reform in Hong Kong reflect
its long-standing suspicions of liberal-minded democrats in Hong Kong. It has
long resisted the participation of members of the democratic camp in key roles of
governance in Hong Kong. The key difference in the recent episode is that the
calendar had run out on Beijing's Basic Law strategy to defer democracy during
the first ten years after the handover. The Basic Law expressly provides for such
deferral in the first ten years but for this to be reconsidered at the end of that
period. At the same time, the July 1, 2003 mass demonstrations by one-half
million people over the proposed national security legislation under Article 23 of
7 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Relevant Issues Concerning Methods for Selecting the HKSAR Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative
Council in 2008, Apr. 26, 2004 reprinted in Chan & Harris, supra note 3 [hereinafter April 26th NPC
Standing Committee Decision].
8 Note that the Chief Executive is currently selected by an 800-member Election Committee and socalled functional constituencies are currently used to fill half the seats in the 60-member Legco. The
800-member Election Committee is itself chosen mostly by similar functional categories of electors. The
pro-government and pro-Beijing orientation of these categories is evident in the fact that only one candidate was nominated in the last two selection processes for the current Chief Executive and for his predecessor. Regarding functional legislators, there is again a pro-government orientation, in that the
government can nearly always count on their support. So for Hong Kong, electoral reform ultimately
aims at direct election of the Chief Executive and abolition of functional constituencies, what Beijing has
barred for the 2007 to 2008 period.
9 The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force, Package of Proposals for the
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2008, Oct.
2005, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/report5/htm [hereinafter Fifth Task Force
Report]. For the Election Committee to choose the Chief Executive, the Government recommended that
800 seats be added with approximately 500 including all members of the District Councils and the additional 300 seats coming from existing functional categories-with the details to be supplied later in a
legislative amendment bill. For Legco, all five new functional seats were to be elected by the District
Councils, with the method of this likewise to be determined in subsequent legislation.
10 K.C. Ng & Philip Pan, Hong Kong Democrats Blast Reform Plan, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 13,
2005.
II Where the Battle Was Won and Lost Democrats' Silence Catches the Opposition Off Guard,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at 3.
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the Basic Law surely put the government under pressure to abandon its resistance
to democracy. 1 2 But in the face of both its own calendar and public pressure,
Beijing and its Hong Kong supporters still remained determined to resist calls for
democratic reform. Though the political environment has over the years gone
through several cycles of public agitation, the Beijing and Hong Kong governments' hostility toward democracy and distrust of the democratic camp has not
changed. 13
How will Hong Kong fare in the face of this clash of political expectations and
cultures? And how will the public, both local and international, come to view the
Hong Kong project? On a substantive level, questions about how well political
institutions are working and the cost engendered by any political deficiencies
need to be explored. This essay will consider the posture of this intense debate
over interpreting Hong Kong's path to democratic development. In this regard,
the next two sections consider the content of the roadmap for democratization
and the most recent debate over this roadmap, addressing both the Basic Law and
its interpretations and the related political debate. It is important to appreciate
why democratization has always been considered a fundamental ingredient of
Hong Kong's political development process. I will then step back and consider
how these factors and other developments may effect the overall constitutional
development of Hong Kong-exposing a much deeper debate over the character
of Hong Kong's political system and the quality of Hong Kong's institutions.
This analysis will consider the health of basic constitutional elements that interact with democratic institutions in order to gauge the urgency of democratic
reform.
II.

The Roadmap for Hong Kong's Constitutional Development

To appreciate the centrality of democratic development in the Hong Kong political debate, it is important to consider the foundational democratic requirements spelled out in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law-as
well as various interpretations now offered of these documents. The 1984 SinoBritish Joint Declaration put in play China's design of "one country, two systems." It signaled the democratic road ahead by providing that the Legislature
shall be chosen by elections and the Chief Executive by elections or consultations
held locally. "One country, two systems" obviously aimed to encourage confidence in Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy." The people of Hong Kong
were asked to put their hearts at ease, as China anticipated the flight of Hong
Kong people fearing the dawn of Chinese rule. For local people the most effective vote remains the one they can make with their feet.
12 See

Fu

HUALING, CAROLE J. PETERSEN, & SIMON

MENTAL FREEDOMS:

N.M.

YOUNG, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDA-

HONG KONG'S ARTICLE 23 UNDER SCRUTINY (2005).

13 There have been occasional outreach efforts to democrats, including a recent first time visit by all
Legco members to Southern China, but these efforts have so far had little substance. Todd Crowell,
Throwing Hong Kong Democrats a Bone, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 22, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/China/GJ22Ad02.html.
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It is important that the Joint Declaration is an international treaty properly
ratified by both governments and registered with the United Nations as such.
China exerted great effort to garner international support by speaking with foreign governments, and encouraging their reliance on the "one country, two systems" framework. Foreign governments were asked to establish separate
economic, social and cultural relations with Hong Kong and to recognize Hong
Kong as a distinct customs and immigration territory. Without question, this
treaty internationalized the Hong Kong issue and encouraged subsequent international concern. Any government establishing separate trade and cultural relations
with Hong Kong would be justified in questioning the bona fides of Hong
Kong's autonomy. The connection between democracy and autonomy is apparent, making Hong Kong's political development a subject of great international
concern. Thus, the stage was set early on for many of the current controversies
over democratization in Hong Kong.
As stipulated in the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law takes up Hong Kong's
democratic promise in Articles 45 and 68, supplemented by Annexes I and II
respectively. Basic Law Article 45 puts the democracy debate on the public
agenda, indicating as follows:
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in light of
the actual situation ... in accordance with the principle of gradual and
orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive
by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nomi-

14
nating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
Triggering the recent reform debate, Basic Law, Annex I specifies election of
the Chief Executive by a "broadly representative" election committee in the first
two terms but provides in Annex I, Article 7 for changing the method of election,
as follows:

If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executives
for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments must be

made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of
the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they
shall be reported to the1 5 Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress for approval.

Taking such action would move the system toward the specified "ultimate aim"
of choosing the Chief Executive "by universal suffrage on nomination by a
broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic
procedures."16
14 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 45 (emphasis added).
15 Basic Law, supra note 1, Annex I, art. 7 (emphasis added).
16 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year
2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the
Year 2008 (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. Apr. 26, 2004) (P.R.C.), http://www.
info.gov.hk/basicjlaw/fulltext/0426npcsce.pdf.
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Article 68 provides essentially the same thing as to forming the Legislative
Council, except that there is no need for a nominating committee and the provision on changing the method in Annex II, part III specifies that the change only
be reported to the Standing Committee "for the record."' 7 Under Basic Law
Annex II, after several expansions of the number of directly elected seats in steps
during the first ten years, by 2007 there will be thirty sitting Legco members who
funcwere directly elected (in 2004), and thirty members representing various
8
groups.'
professional
and
social
business,
tional constituencies-from
As noted above, on April 6, 2004, the Standing Committee reacted to calls for
democracy in Hong Kong, offering its own interpretation of the above noted
Annex I, Article 7 and Annex II, part III. This interpretation added new requirements to change the method of selection, essentially giving the Central Government complete control over initiating change. In its interpretation, the Standing
Committee specified in relevant part as follows:
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall make a report to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress as regards whether there is a need to make an amendment; and
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law, ...
make a determination in the light of the actual situation in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principles of gradualand orderlyprogress. The bills on the amendments to the
method for selecting the Chief Executive and the method of forming the
Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on bills and motions and
the proposed amendments to such bills shall be introduced by the Government ... into the Legislative Council. (emphasis added).19
The Standing Committee interpretation wisely concluded that "subsequent to
2007" included changes for the method of selection in 2007 and 2008.
The Standing Committee was widely criticized both for intervening in this
way, by making an interpretation respecting a local election, and for effectively
revising the order of decision specified in the Basic Law. The interpretation,
which is binding on Hong Kong, effectively amounts to an amendment of the
Basic Law by specifying a route to reform that undercuts the seeming primary
role of Legco.2 0 It gives the central government, through the Chief Executive
and to the exclusion of the Legislative Council, complete control of any initiation
of democratic reform. This has generated concern because the Basic Law in
17 Annex II, pt. III provides,
With regard to the method for forming the Legislative Council ... and its procedures for voting
on bills and motions after 2007, if there is a need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such
amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of
the Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. (emphasis added).
18 Basic Law, supra note 1, Annex II.
19 April 6th NPC Standing Committee Interpretation, supra note 5,

3.

20 Basic Law, supra note 1, Annex II, pt. III.

170

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 3, Issue 2

The Basic Law and Democratization in Hong Kong
Article 159 specifies its own method of amendment, requiring approval by the
full NPC and specifying that amendments not contravene the basic policies of the
PRC specified in the Joint Declaration. 21 The exercise of such power to override
the Basic Law not only impedes democratic development but also puts strain on
the rule of law. Under the formula articulated in the interpretation, the Legislative Council can at best serve as a source of political pressure, perhaps by resolution, and it can approve or disapprove any final change to the methods of
selection when presented. In late 2005, after the Government released its reform
plan, the Legislative Council did precisely that, withholding its approval of the
Government's electoral reform proposal.
The PRC government had not always taken the view that it could intervene so
readily in this democratic reform decision. In a comment in the People's Daily
on March 18, 1993, the then Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office, Mr. Lu Ping, stated, "As for how the legislature will be constituted after
its third term, all that is needed is for two-thirds of legislators to approve, the
chief executive to give his consent, and then report to the Standing Committee
for the record. There is no need for Central Government approval. How Hong
Kong develops democracy in the future is entirely within the autonomy of Hong
Kong."'22 Even this Basic Law version is, of course, subject to the obvious restraint that the current Chief Executive is bound to follow his mainland employer's instructions.
The April 6, 2004 PRC interpretation was quickly followed in just ten days
time by a Government Task Force report on constitutional reform and the indicated report by the Hong Kong Chief Executive specifying that there was a need
to change the method for selecting the Chief Executive and forming the Legislative Council. 23 While specifying a need for change, the Chief Executive and his
Task Force left little doubt that any changes forthcoming were unlikely to satisfy
the public demands for democratic reform. Nine conditions specified in the
Chief Executive's report, and elaborated in the Task Force report, signaled to
most members of the public that the change in methods of selection was going to
be minimal. By specifying how the "actual situation" would be evaluated, the
Chief Executive's report appeared to add again to the Basic Law by specifying
conditions and factors to consider that were in no way apparent in the Basic Law
text.24 Both reports emphasized the lack of political maturity in politicians and
political groups, the need for different sectors of society to be represented, and
that "the pace should not be too fast."' 25 They also emphasized that any changes
26
must not have any adverse economic effect.
21 Id., art. 159.
22 See Frank Ching, Be Consistent, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 30, 2004.
23 The Second Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force, Issues of Principle in the Basic
Law Relating to ConstitutionalDevelopment, Apr. 16, 2004 reprinted in Chan & Harris, supra note 3
[hereinafter Second Task Force Report]; Chief Executive's Report, supra note 6.
24 Id.; see Basic Law, supra note 1, Annex II, pt. InI.
25 See Chief Executive's Report, supra note 6.
26 Id.
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The April 26, 2004 response of the Standing Committee to the Chief Executive's report sealed the doom for democratic reform, essentially barring any
meaningful reform for the 2007-2008 elections by requiring continued use of the
Election Committee for selecting the Chief Executive-though its membership
could be increased-and specifying that the current ratio of directly elected to
functional legislators be maintained.2 7 The only reform options left open for the
2007-2008 elections were to increase the size of the Election Committee and the
Legco. In October 2005, this was precisely what the Government proposed: to
double the Election Committee membership to 1600, and add five functional
seats representing the District Councils balanced against five directly elected
seats.2 8 While this proposal would have somewhat increased participation and
the number of directly elected legislators, it would have further entrenched nondemocratic forces. Anyone doing the math could see that democrats would have
wound up with about the same relative proportions in Legco and an inability to
win the post of Chief Executive-effectively maintaining the status quo. While
the current Chief Executive seems more popular than the former one, this model
clearly did not satisfy democrats and they used the requirement of two-thirds
approval to block it in Legco when it came up for vote in December 2005. The
differences in political values between the Hong Kong government and the democratic camp could not be more stark.
III.

The 2004-2005 Constitutional Debate

These interpretations and reports took place in an environment that conveyed
extreme Beijing hostility toward democratization in Hong Kong-a hostility that
met with considerable local and international objection. Prior to April 2004,
Hong Kong democracy supporters had been subject to a two-month barrage of
severe criticism. Beijing officials and "legal experts," as well as their local Hong
Kong leftist supporters, subjected the calls for democracy to a variety of attacks
that sought to set the stage for importing other requirements for reform that were
not mentioned in the Basic Law. 29 In thinking about the relationship between
democracy and constitutionalism in Hong Kong it is important to consider the
gap in interpretation of the Basic Law formula between the two sides and the
strength of conviction that divides them. In 2004-2005 this was on display more
clearly than it had been at any time since the 1997 change-over. The interpretations of the Basic law offered during this period were intensely political. Beijing
launched what was essentially a five-stage attack on the democratic camp.
First, Beijing launched the so-called "patriot debate," taking a swipe at foreign
interference. Hong Kong was told that under any democratic reform "patriots
27
28

See April 26th NPC Standing Committee Decision, supra note 7.
5.04, 5.17.
See Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 9,

This barrage began with the visit of several elderly mainland legal experts in mid-January 2004.
CHINA MORNNG POST, Jan. 17,
2004, at Al. A finger-wagging Mr. Xiao Weiyun even attacked constitutional judicial review by the
courts and votes of confidence by Legco. Jimmy Cheung, Courts and Legco "Can't Interpret Basic
Law," SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 17, 2004, at A3.
29

Gary Cheung, Universal Suffrage in 2007 Flouts Basic Law, SOUTH
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must be the main body of those who govern Hong Kong. '30 While Deng Xiaoping was cited for this requirement, Deng was frequently on record as indicating
that one need not be pro-communist to be a patriot, and that Hong Kong people
who criticize the communist party could also be considered patriots. 3' Categories of democracy activists who were labeled unpatriotic in this campaign included, as paraphrased in various media reports, those who are subversive of
mainland authorities, those who support Taiwan independence, those who raise
the flag of democracy but are in fact running dogs for Western forces, and those
who opposed Article 23 national security legislation. 32 The patriot debate
reached its zenith when the former Democratic Party Chair Martin33Lee was criticized for testifying before a U.S. Senate hearing on Hong Kong.
The second stage of the attack on democracy was to offer a steady diet of
Deng Xiaoping statements arguing the meaning of "gradual and orderly progress." These were cherry-picked to suit the moment and again with no Basic
Law support. 34 As it became apparent that Deng's statements could be used on
either side, this barrage slowed down. Ultimately, one suspects the best source of
Deng's thought is the Basic Law, which is better subject to current interpretation.
The rule of law would be better served by reliance on the Basic Law text than on
vague and contradictory interpretations of Deng's thoughts.
The third stage of this attack on democratic reform became even more aggressive when Beijing officials and media started publishing threats to take emergency action. At this stage NPC vice-chairman Sheng Huaren delivered a long
lecture on Beijing's power to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong. 35 The
China Daily hinted at the possibility that the Central Government would dismiss
the Legislative Council if democrats take more than thirty seats in the September
elections. 36 The China Daily warned, "[i]f those who try to use democracy to
30 Ambrose Leung & Gary Cheung, Patriots Should Govern Hong Kong, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 11, 2004, at Al.
31 "Selective" Quotes Skew Deng's Words, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 3, 2004, at A2.
32 Gary Cheung & Ambrose Leung, Xinhua Releases Criteriafor Being True Patriot, SouTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
33 Mr. An Min, a P.R.C. Vice Minister of Commerce and leading mainland official attacked even
Martin Lee's father, General Li Yin-Wo, a highly regarded KMT military officer who had fought in the
resistance against Japan. Cheung Chi-fai, Gary Cheung & Ambrose Leung, Beijing Hits at US Over
Democrats' Washington Trip, Senate Hearing on Democracy in Hong Kong Draws Fire, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 3, 2004, at Al; Ambrose Leung, An Min's Wrath Turns to Martin Lee's Father,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 2004, at Al.
34 The April 6th NPC Standing Committee Basic Law interpretation and the Task Force and Chief
Executive reports offer little hint of what "gradual and orderly progress" means, other than to say it must
not go too fast and that this depends on the actual situation. "Selective" supra note 31, at A2. The actual
situation is said to mean more than just having popular support, including a variety of innocuous legal
factors, as well as "maturity of political talent and political groups." See Second Task Force Report,
supra note 23; see also Chief Executive's Report, supra note 6.
35 Gary Cheung, Beijing Will Step in if Security is Threatened,SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, March
13, 2004, at Al.
36 It is true that the Basic Law has provisions allowing for dissolution of the Legco, but these only
provide that the Chief Executive may dissolve the Legco, after consultations, if it refuses to pass bills
proposed by the Chief Executive. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 50. Such provisions require a new
election to form a new Legco and specify that if the Legco again refuses to pass such bill then the Chief
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exclude the Communist Party of China and 'respect Taiwan self-determination'
take the majority of seats in Legco, Hong Kong's executive-led government will
collapse and the central authority and national security will be severely challenged."'37 The local pro-Beijing paper the Wen Wei Po quoted an unnamed Beijing official as saying, "[I] have a knife. Usually it is not used but now you force
me to use it."38 These statements were understood locally to threaten dissolution
of the Legislative Council if pro-Beijing parties lost control in the next election.
The fourth stage in the crisis was for mainland experts to lecture Hong Kong
on the spirit of the Basic Law and the demerits of fake democracy. Hong Kong
was told by mainland "legal expert" Xiao Weiyun that the spirit, not words, is the
key to interpreting the Basic Law. 39 The spirit in question appeared to be a very
mainland-regarding spirit and offered little regard to the long ago assurances that
Hong Kong people should put their hearts at ease and that the rest of the world
business elite also
might rely on Hong Kong's autonomy. The pro-Beijing
40
weighed in on this spirit, worrying about a welfare state.
The fifth and final stage in this effort to contain calls for democratic reform
was embodied in the Standing Committee's interpretations and the ultimate reform the Government put forward. Having used two months of vociferous attacks to push the goal post back, mainland officials then began to sound more
conciliatory by mid-2004, even sending a mainland official team to Hong Kong
to explain the first interpretation. 41 Few were convinced. In respect of said interpretation, mainland officials emphasized that ultimate authority rest with Beijing. 42 This suggested that Hong Kong was constrained by whatever line Beijing
specified. There has been little indication as to the limits of this power and how
it maintains China's commitments under the Joint Declaration. The interpretation, by effectively amending the Basic Law, posed a severe threat to Hong
Kong's autonomy and rule of law, and largely took the democratic reform debate
out of Hong Kong hands.
Even at some future stage, when some forms of full direct elections emerge,
the opportunities for mischief loom large. Even in late 2003, various pro-Beijing
Hong Kong political sectors had already begun to hint at their substantive positions on the ultimate question of the shape of Hong Kong democracy. While the
democratic camp has insisted that the nominating committee for popular election
Executive must resign. Id., arts. 52, 70. It is seriously in doubt whether a non-elected Chief Executive
under the current system would willingly subject himself to what amounts to a referendum.
37 Cannix Yau, Democratic Legco "Will See Executive Collapse," Tim STANDARD, Mar. 2, 2004, at
Al.
38 Edward Cody, Hong Kong Reminded that China is in Charge, Beijing Issues Warning Against
Direct Elections, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERvIcE, Feb. 19, 2004, at A14.
39 Ambrose Leung & Louisa Yan, "Spirit, not Words," is the Key to Basic Law, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING PosT, Mar. 16, 2004, at Al; Louisa Yan & Ambrose Leung, Democrats are Accused of Betrayal, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 16, 2004, at A2.
40 Wilson Wong, Why Less Democracy Means More Free Lunches, SoUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 16, 2004, at 13 (responding to these various arguments by business elite).
41 Meeting attended by author. See also Gary Cheung, Beijing Lays Down the Law for Dialogue,
SoUTm CHINA MORNING POST, May 17, 2005, at 2.
42 Id.
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of the Chief Executive not be used as a device to screen out democratic candidates, their stance faces severe resistance from Beijing supporters. 4 3 Pro-government parties will encourage Beijing to do just that-use the nominating
committee as a screening device. The pro-government Liberal Party has generally refused to endorse democratization or has favored it always at some future
date. an The leftist pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong
Kong ("DAB"), while saying that it supports democracy, has staked out only a
quasi-democratic position, frequently arguing for a "restrictive nomination committee."'45 Prior to Beijing's interference, the government was non-committal on
the nominating committee, though the government's Secretary for Constitutional
Affairs, Stephen Lam, had indicated that the government would not block democrats from running for Chief Executive. 46 Of course, running and actually having
a chance at nomination are two different things. More recently Secretary Stephen Lam has made the case that even functional
constituencies do not contradict
'4 7
the requirement of "universal suffrage.
In the early discussions, before all reform was scotched, the democratic camp,
in a spirit of compromise, had offered at least two possibilities on how to form
the nominating committee. One possibility that was suggested by both the Democratic Party and the Article 45 Concern Group (now the Civic Party) would be
to use the Legislative Council as the nominating committee.48 With thirty functional members representing narrow constituencies, the Legislative Council was
not viewed by the democratic camp as broadly representative, as required by the
Basic Law. But this method was considered acceptable by many democrats for
2007, as long as only a small number (five had been suggested) of nominators
were required, so as not to block democratic candidates. A second alternative
offered by the Article 45 Concern Group was to use the existing Election Committee structure as the nominating committee for the 2007 election-with a direct
election then to follow. Democrats would likely have accepted this highly unrepresentative body if only nomination by about 5% of its members were required
for a candidate to be nominated for direct public election. With the government
having halted real democratic reform for 2007-2008, these debates over what
shape direct elections may ultimately take are awaited.
43 See Jimmy Cheung, Article 45 Group to Push for Democratic Reforms, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at 2 (citing a new pamphlet, Article 45 Concern Group, Opinion 1, November
2003); Gary Cheung & Raymond Ma, Democrats Unveil Their Blueprint for "Balanced Election,"
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 18, 2004, at 3.
44 See Cheung & Ma, supra note 43 at 3.
45 Early in the debate the then DAB Chair, Mr. Tsang Yok-Sing, appeared to suggest that such
restrictive process, that presumably might exclude democrats, would still represent progress over the
present small circle election by an 800 member Election Committee. Klaudia Lee, Former DAB Chief
Backs Direct Election with "Filter," SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at 1.
46 Mr. Lam gave no clear indication of how the nominating committee might function. See Klaudia
Lee, Chief Executive Election "Open to Democracy," SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at 2.
47
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48 See Cheung, supra note 43, at A2; Cheung & Ma, supra note 43, at 3.

Volume 3, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

175

The Basic Law and Democratization in Hong Kong

IV.

Hong Kong's Historical Constitutional Path

It would be wrong to consider the current issues of democratic reform in Hong
Kong divorced from the broader issues of constitutional development and good
governance. In many respects Hong Kong has not suffered from a lack of vision.
What sometimes has been lacking is a full appreciation of how imaginative the
Sino-British agreement was and the sufficient political will to carry it out. The
many crises Hong Kong has faced in the twenty years since the Sino-British Joint
Declaration was signed have often been a consequence of incoherence in execution of this design. China's leaders and their Hong Kong supporters have often
been unwilling to relinquish the degree of democratic control necessary to carry
out the original constitutional design. In 2004 it was the failures of the current
system of governance that inspired more assertive public action, largely as a negative response to official arrogance and failure. The present constitutional juncture offers some very clear images and experience for assessing Hong Kong's
constitutional health and the optimal road ahead. Coming to understand the best
path forward would clearly reduce difficulties for China on the diplomatic front
and advance Hong Kong's long-term interests.
To assess Hong Kong's constitutional development one must consider how
constitutional institutions work and their relationship to democracy. I have long
felt that constitutionalists over-emphasize the constraints of constitutional government without sufficiently appreciating its positive empowering role. 49 Constitutional government provides a venue for empowerment and legitimacy.50 If
anything, in the first six years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
("HKSAR"), Hong Kong officials have not lacked constraint as much as a source
of legitimacy and venues to mobilize support behind the many difficult choices
they have had to make. The institutions of constitutionalism therefore aim to
empower the public and constrain officials in the interest of political legitimacy
and stable policy formation and execution. In Hong Kong, local officials have
often had to commit more energy to guarding their seemingly unwarranted powers and privileges then to addressing imaginative solutions to pressing public
problems. The taint of government by the privileged has extended to the Legco,
as a variety of legislators hold their seats from small-circle functional constituencies, and seek to develop and maintain their privileged status.
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration put Hong Kong on a visionary path to
constitutional democracy.5 1 In many respects it aimed to resolve the above noted
tensions shaped by deep divides in political culture. It offered a formula that
stipulated the drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law and its liberal democratic
content. This formula gave expression to Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong
by assigning content to the concept "one country, two systems" articulated in
49 Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, reprinted in CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

195-240 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad, eds., 1988).

(1991); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
BAR OF POLITCS, 29-33 (2d ed. 1986).
51 Michael Davis, ConstitutionalismUnder Chinese Rule: Hong Kong After The Handover,27 DENv.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 275, 275 (1999).
50
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Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). At the
same time, it put into motion a process of liberal democratization that continues
to this day. Chinese officials have generally acknowledged that the concept "one
country, two systems" aimed to cope with local and international mistrust of the
mainland system. Paradoxically, many of the political battles over Hong Kong's
constitutional and democratic development have been in areas where mainland
mistrust of Hong Kong and foreign intentions have been evident. The mainland
has been resistant to democratization and suspicious that hostile foreign forces
have influenced the actions of local democrats.
While Chinese leaders originally offered imaginative solutions to the problem
of Hong Kong's return, they may not have fully appreciated the constitutional
implications of their vision. It was generally understood that anything less than
substantial constitutional democracy would fail to secure adequate confidence in
Hong Kong's future. 52 The elements of constitutional democracy typically include democratic elections, the protection of human rights and liberty, and the
rule of law, especially constitutional judicial review. 53 The Joint Declaration addresses all three such elements of constitutional democracy. The Joint Declaration paragraph 3 and Annex I, Article I promise that the Chief Executive is to be
chosen by "elections or consultations" held locally, and that the legislature is to
be chosen by "elections." Article XIII lists the full panoply of liberal rights, of
which more than half relate to freedom of expression, and require application of
the international human rights covenants. 54 The rule of law is expressly secured
by the continued application of the common law, the independence and finality
of the local courts, the supremacy of the Basic Law, and the right to challenge
executive actions in the courts. 55 The latter right presumably includes constitutional judicial review, as is now widely accepted. These commitments were all
stipulated for inclusion in the Hong Kong Basic Law.
The Basic Law faithfully incorporates most of the requirements of the Joint
Declaration. But in the key three areas noted, the Basic Law sometimes comes
up short, either in its text or in its interpretation. Malleability of existing institutions has put a high premium on democratic development to afford the highest
level of oversight. This has placed a premium value on the coherence and liberality of Basic Law interpretations to provide a workable constitutional framework. Disputes over Basic Law interpretation have been evident in a variety of
crises Hong Kong has faced in recent years. Full direct election of the Legco was
promised but not provided. Liberal human rights guarantees are adequately provided, but are put at risk by national security and public order provisions elsewhere in the Basic Law. Constitutional judicial review was long in doubt from
the lack of explicit reference in the text. While that doubt has been resolved
favorably by judicial decision, Beijing and pro-Beijing politicians at critical moments have sought to challenge such resolution. Lastly, actions of the govern52 Id. at 277.
53 Id.
54 See Joint Declaration, supra note 2.
55 Joint Declaration, supra note 2,
3(3), (5), (12), & Annex I, §§ 1-111, XIlI.
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ment to overturn Hong Kong's courts and various Standing Committee
interpretations have especially put the health of that institution at risk. These
developments are elaborated under three main headings in the discussion that
follows.
A.

Democracy

From Beijing's perspective democratic development has seemed to pose the
biggest threat to Beijing's control over events in Hong Kong. The Basic Law
text, while ultimately favoring full democracy, in many respects reads like a
roadmap on how to obstruct democratic development in Hong Kong. The level
of distrust between competing supporters of authoritarian and liberal ideals is at
its highest in the debate over democracy. As noted above, such obstacles on the
road to full democratization are enhanced by the lack of political commitment to
democracy both in the government and among its supporters. There has been no
evidence that the local government in any way challenges Beijing's efforts at
controlling the process of democratization, a situation that demonstrates a rather
weak sense of local autonomy.
As noted above, the Hong Kong government, with Beijing's blessing had recently suggested the addition of ten seats to Legco (five directly elected and five
functional) and a doubling of the Election Committee to 1600 members. But
given the rejection of these meager proposals by Legco, Hong Kong will continue to have in place a sixty-member Legislative Council where only half of the
seats are directly elected-a ratio that also had to be maintained under the government's suggested model. Legislators who represent narrow functional constituencies that mostly favor pro-business and pro-government candidates fill the
remaining thirty seats. The Chief Executive has been chosen, in an uncontested
election, by an 800-member Election Committee, itself chosen largely by functional sectors.5 6 To make matters worse, the existing electoral laws give an appearance of unfairness because the electoral model results in groups of
vote getting a much smaller
candidates who win large majorities of the popular
57
percentage of the actual seats in the Legco.
Given the many obvious failures of this system it can be wondered how long
the government and its supporters will insist on maintaining this system in the
face of continuing calls for reform. As the Standing Committee in its recent
interpretations has essentially allocated to itself complete control over the democratization process, and while the Hong Kong government shares Beijing's view,
there are few prospects for meaningful political reform in the foreseeable future.
Official Hong Kong simply lacks an autonomous voice.
56

Basic Law, supra note 1, Annexes I & II. See Davis, supra note 51, at 312.

In the first post-handover Legislative Council election on May 24, 1998, various democrats received just under 60% of the vote. Davis, supra note 51 at 284 (citing to Record Turnout Poised to Give
Democrats Sweeping Victory, SoUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 25, 1998 at 1; See also Lessons of the
Poll, SoUm CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 1998, at 18). A similar voter outcome and seat distribution
was evident in the last Legco election in September 2004.
57
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In addition to electoral shortcomings a democratic deficit is built into the very
fabric of the Basic Law. Basic Law Article 74 requires members of Legco to get
the Chief Executive's approval before they can introduce bills involving public
expenditure or government policy. 58 Additionally, amendments to government
bills and motions or bills introduced by individual Legco members require majority approval by each of two different groups of legislators: the thirty from functional constituencies and the thirty directly elected members. The Government
has argued, so far unsuccessfully, in challenging the Legislative Rules of Procedure, that even amendments to government bills proposed by legislators require
the Chief Executive's approval. This government position was reinforced in the
recent Standing Committee interpretation requiring that even amendments to the
electoral laws under Annexes I and II be introduced by the government. Though
Basic Law Annex II, part III would have allowed a change in "the procedures for
voting on bills and motions," the final Standing Committee response to the government's report disallowed this change as well.
Avenues to amend the Basic Law are equally blocked. The general power to
amend the Basic Law is vested in the NPC. 59 Even local legislative proposals for
amendment require a two-thirds vote in the Legco, the consent of two-thirds of
the local NPC deputies (invariably "pro-China"), and the approval of the Chief
Executive. 60 This is not just a matter of interpretation but also a matter of political will. Closing the democratic deficit requires convincing a large number of
currently favored politicians that the model is fundamentally flawed and needs
correcting.
It is not difficult for ordinary observers to appreciate the cost of such a democratic deficit. This system, at moments of crisis, tends to produce a legitimacy
gap between those legislators who are directly elected, and officials and legislators who are not. With directly elected legislators in permanent minority under
the current model, democrats are essentially left to the politics of shame to pressure officials in power or in the legislative majority to support popular initiatives.
This tends to produce political crises when public outrage is at its highestproducing government by expediency and often government by crisis management. 61 Such authoritarian government, in Jon Elster's terms, is unable to make
itself unable to interfere when it is expedient to do so. 62 In the July 2003 demonstrations over the government's proposed Article 23 legislation, the legitimacy
gap was most striking in the arrogance of government officials, supporters, and
the public outrage that followed. This system is highly confrontational and encourages popular suspicion of political leaders.
The local government has attempted some short-cut measures to solve this
credibility problem. In 2002, the Hong Kong government put in place a so-called
58
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59 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 159.
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"ministerial '6 system,"
seeking to offer up the "accountability" of non-elected
"ministers. 3 The government presumably aimed to offer this as an alternative
to full democratization. The track record of ministerial accountability has been
less than satisfactory. Ministers still lack the capacity to mobilize public support
for their policies and their occasional ineptitude may simply serve to multiply the
number of crises, in the sense that there are just more targets for media attention
and still no genuine public accountability. With much of the foundation for democracy in place, one can only question the wisdom of maintaining this flawed
and unstable system.
B.

Human Rights

The Hong Kong Basic Law has a satisfactory chapter on human rights, which
includes the various liberal rights specified in the Joint Declaration and requires
that any restrictions on rights meet the standards of the international human rights
covenants. As with democratic development, the chief obstacle to realization of
the liberal human rights guarantees promised in the Joint Declaration appears to
be interpretation. Beijing's interpretive role has generally been to restrict human
rights-to which the local government offers no resistance. Two articles in Basic
Law Chapter II on local-central relations especially elevate concerns over mainland interference: Article 18 allows for application of national law in cases of
emergency or where the central government determines there is "turmoil" in the
region; and Article 23 requires the enactment of local laws on subversion, secession, sedition and state secrets.
As noted above, 64 the government-proposed national security law advanced in
late 2002 and early 2003 in respect of the Article 23 requirements was a matter of
great public controversy and international solicitude. 65 These Article 23 legisla66
tive proposals were widely criticized for being too vague and overly broad.
The arrogant and insensitive approach to promoting the legislation by government officials and pro-government supporters appeared to further outrage the
public. While the government withdrew the legislative proposal in the face of
such intense public opposition,67 the government's stance fomented a serious political crisis whose effects linger in the ongoing debate over democratization.
In Hong Kong, as anywhere, human rights protection ultimately depends on
public support and official solicitude. Such official solicitude is called into play
in official interpretations in the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial
power. In the absence of democracy the judicial role has been especially important. Without adequate enforcement human rights will not flourish. Enforcement
63 See Davis, supra note 51.
64 Id.
65 This concern was most directly expressed when one-half million demonstrators took to the streets
on July 1, 2003. Ambrose Leung, Klaudia Lee & Ernest Kong, Hopes for Freedom Float Upon a Sea of
PoliticalDiscontent, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, July 2, 2003, at 3.
66 Id.
67 Klaudia Lee, Security Chief Says Consultations on Article 23 will Continue, SOUTH CHINA MORNINO POST, Sept. 7, 2003, at 1.
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may depend on official avenues such as human rights or equal opportunities commissions and on the judiciary. Ultimately, there is concern that the local courts,
exercising constitutional judicial review, retain the power to draw the boundary
between basic rights and competing government and private concerns. In the
face of China's dramatically contrasting rights tradition, the strength of the local
institutional commitment is especially important. Chinese officials or their local
supporters seeking to override the local security of human rights would profoundly undermine the "one country, two systems" formula.
The level of public support for human rights in Hong Kong has been surprisingly strong. The central position of human rights in the local political culture
was initially stimulated by the human rights guarantees in the 1984 Joint Declaration. The tragic events at Tiananmen in 1989 further brought vitality to Hong
Kong's human rights discourse. 6 8 This vitality has tended to support the legal
and legislative processes. Energetic human rights support continued to infuse the
public debate during the handover period and beyond. The massive demonstrations against the proposed Article 23 legislation on July 1, 2003 and similar prodemocracy demonstrations on July 1, 2004 showed that public support for human
rights and democracy remains undiminished.
The most striking quality of the Hong Kong human rights regime is its international character, a feature that sharply contrasts with China's approach to human
rights. The foundation for this international character was laid in the Joint Declaration, which included substantial human rights guarantees and maintenance of
the international human rights covenants. The 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance,
which remains in force copies almost verbatim the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 69 The ICCPR has therefore shaped interpretations of Hong Kong's rights commitments. The government and the Legco,
"in the last years of colonial rule, reformed many non-conforming colonial laws
to better protect human rights."'70 Basic Law Article 39, likewise incorporates
the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR"), imposing the requirements of such covenants as a limit on
any rights restrictions. 71 These international rights guarantees have therefore
been enforced by constitutional judicial review both before and after the
handover. Subsequent to the handover, the Chinese government has likewise
68 Davis, supra note 51, at 286.
69 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991) reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1310 (1991); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); Davis, supra note 51, at 286 (citing
Johannes Chan, The Hong Kong Bill of Rights 1991-1995: A Statistical Overview, reprinted in HONG
KONG'S BILL OF RIGHTS: Two YEARS BEFORE 1997 (George Edwards & Johannes Chan eds., 1995)).
When the Bill of Rights Ordinance was enacted, the colonial constitution, the Letters Patent, was also
amended to include the ICCPR, a change which effectively implemented constitutional judicial review to
enforce rights.
70 Davis, supra note 51, at 287. Amended laws included: 1) Societies Ordinance (1992); 2) Television Ordinance (1993); 3) Broadcast Ordinance (1993); 4) Public Order Ordinance (1995); and 5) Emergency Regulations Ordinance (1995). The international character of the rights regime was enhanced by
frequent judicial reference to overseas common law and European Union precedent. See R. v. Sin Yau
Ming [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 127, at 141-42 (CA).
71 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 39.
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continued to file reports on behalf of Hong Kong under the international human
rights covenants. The application of international standards and international solicitude is certainly encouraged by these practices.
Causes for pessimism about human rights also remain substantial. Chinese
officials and local pro-Beijing politicians have often appeared to be the chief
attackers of human rights in Hong Kong. This was especially evident in the
developments immediately surrounding the handover. 72 While Hong Kong's
rights guarantees remain in tact, this hostile attitude does give reason for concern.
The lack of appreciation of human rights fundamentals was on display in the
government's Article 23 national security proposals. 73 Whether, after massive
demonstrations successively on July 1, 2003 and 2004, Beijing and its supporters
in Hong Kong have sufficiently come to appreciate the importance of human
rights to Hong Kong's success and local wellbeing remains to be seen-though
the recent Beijing interpretations concerning democratic reform bode ill in this
regard.
C.

Rule of Law

As noted above, the interpretations of the judiciary in exercising the power of
constitutional judicial review will have a great bearing on whether the current
system comes up short regarding human rights. Both the Joint Declaration and
74
the Basic Law implicitly require the exercise of constitutional judicial review.
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal ("CFA") in the "right of abode" case
acknowledged the power of constitutional judicial review in the local Hong Kong
courts. 75 The future vigor of this institution
was put in doubt by the subsequent
76
government attack on this judgment.
Article 158 of the Basic Law offers the main guidance regarding interpretation
of the Basic Law. While it vests the power of interpretation in the NPC Standing
Committee, it specifies that the Standing Committee authorizes local courts,
when adjudicating cases, to interpret those provisions, which are "within the limits of the autonomy of the Region" and "other provisions." If the CFA is con72 After the handover, the Provisional Legislature enacted new laws regarding public order and societies, restricting the right of abode of mainland children (later challenged in the well-known right of abode
case), reducing labor rights protections and rejecting actions for private violation under the Bill of Rights.
Davis, supra note 51, at 289 (citing Margaret Ng, Threat to Our Civil Rights, SOUTH CHINA MORNING

POST, Apr. 11, 1997).
Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 22.
See Joint Declaration, supra note 2, Annex I, arts. 2, 3 & 13; see Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 2,
8, 17, 80-96 & 158. Such judicial role may be supplemented by other institutions that provide affordable
avenues of complaint about public and private rights violations.
75 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315, 318-319 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter
Ng Ka Ling I]. Article 24 of the Basic Law provides that Hong Kong residents include "persons of
Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong." The suit was brought by several children of Hong
Kong residents claiming a denial of their basic right of residence under a newly enacted immigration
ordinance that required them to apply on the mainland for an exit permit, a process that could take several
years.
76 See Mark O'Neill, Beijing Says Abode Ruling was Wrong and Should be Changed, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1; Cliff Buddle et al., Judges Asked to Clarify Right of Abode Decision,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at 1.
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fronted with the interpretation of provisions that are the responsibility of the
Central People's government or concern local-central relations, then it must refer
the matter to the Standing Committee. Upon such referral, the Standing Committee decides the matter with the advice of the Committee for the Basic Law. 77 The
scope of these provisions is still to be worked out in local jurisprudence and
related politics.
In the "right of abode" case the CFA took a purposeful and generous approach
to interpreting the constitutional rights guaranteed in the Basic Law. The Court
also explicitly accepted for itself the right to determine when to refer provisions
respecting local-central relations or matters of central authority to the Standing
Committee for interpretation. The Court concluded that referral was not required
in the pending "right of abode" case. This decision was widely applauded in
Hong Kong for its firm defense of human rights and the rule of law. But the
judgment attracted a very harsh official response in two respects. Immediately
after the judgment, the government, in a motion for clarification, attacked the
obiter dicta (non-binding aspect) in the judgment, where the Court declared it had
the right to "examine" acts of the NPC for conformity to the Basic Law-not
necessarily a strategically wise claim by a court still feeling out its power. ProBeijing critics had claimed the Court was putting itself above the NPC. In its
clarification judgment, the Court explicitly stated that it did not hold itself above
the NPC or its Standing Committee, though the Court essentially restated its original position.7 8 A second, more serious attack on the judgment and the rule of
law occurred in May 1999. After the government issued a report claiming the
judgment would produce a flood of 1.67 million migrants claiming the "right of
abode" into Hong Kong, the Government requested and was granted a reinterpreby the Standing Committee, effectively overturntation of the relevant provisions
79
ing the CFA interpretation.
It seems that final judgments in Hong Kong, where constitutional rights are
concerned, are not final, at least beyond the narrow application to named parties.
The local government can simply file a motion with the Standing Committee to
reinterpret the Basic Law and effectively overturn them as to the law of the case.
Given the general level of consensus between the Beijing government and its
77 Decision of the National People's Congress to Approve the Proposal by the Drafting Committee
for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the Establishment of the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Under the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress, Adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Con-

gress on Apr. 4, 1990 (published with the Basic Law). The role of the courts and the Standing Committee are addressed in Basic Law Articles 17, 19, and 158.
78 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.C.F.A.R. 577, 578 (C.F.A) [hereinafter Ng
Ka Ling II]. The Court concluded, "nor did the court's judgment question, and the Court accepts that it
cannot question, the authority of the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee to do any act
which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein."
79 See Chris Yeung, Court Gives 1.67m Right of Abode, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 29,
1999, at 1. The government asked the Standing Committee to re-interpret Articles 22 and 24(3) to
effectively overturn the CFA Final Judgment. Chris Yeung, NPC Will be Asked to Revoke Abode Rights
for 1.5m Migrants, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 19, 1999, at 1. The government sidestepped the

problem of a lack of expressed power in the government to make such referral by seeking an endorsement from the Legislative Council and asking the State Council to make the referral on its behalf.
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locally anointed officials, this may effectively amount to the local government
having the right to overturn the judgment of the CFA, at least as to any other
effected parties. The prospect of the government freely interfering with judicial
finality has brought suspicion on the government in nearly every controversial
legislative outing, where an assumption must be made that the courts may not be
able to correct any legislative deficiency. This suspicion was especially apparent
in debates concerning the government's proposed Article 23 national security
legislation. Will the government someday avail itself of such referral in respect
of interpreting the boundaries between national security and freedom in Hong
Kong?
Unconstrained government power was again on display in the above noted
Standing Committee interpretation regarding democratic reform. While that interpretation did not result from a court case, it raised the troubling possibility that
the Standing Committee may freely take back the power to interpret matters
within local autonomy, though such interpretation power was expressly authorized to local courts in Article 158 of the Basic Law. Furthermore, the Standing
Committee's wide interpretations of its allegedly broad authority have challenged
the rule and role of law. Observers will be left to wonder if there are any limits
on the Standing Committee's authority. Are these interpretive interferences to be
back-door methods to effectively amend the Basic Law and reach outcomes that
officials favor?
V.

Conclusion

Government missteps and crises have spawned a great deal of public skepticism about the existing constitutional model in Hong Kong, both locally and
internationally. This skepticism demonstrates a variety of genuine reasons for
democratic reform. Yet, in the recent Article 23 and political reform debates,
government officials in both Beijing and Hong Kong have shown little appreciation of these difficulties. The arrogant attitude that has been a pervasive feature
of Hong Kong's anointed leaders and their supporters has certainly been an important stimulant for public outrage. This reached its apex during the Article 23
debate. The government's somewhat chastened attitude since July 1, 2003 may
hopefully signal a change in approach. The new Chief Executive has shown
greater appreciation of the message of public indignation communicated on that
day.
What the above analysis tells us is that this is not just about what democratic
reform the Basic Law may allow in Articles 45 and 68 and Annexes I and II.
What is at stake here involves larger issues of Hong Kong's constitutional development. Government by expediency and crisis and public action by shaming are
an inherent feature of a constitutional system that cherishes liberty and the rule of
law but fails to afford democracy. Such an authoritarian system may frequently
put important constitutional institutions at risk. Such actions may engender public indignation and criticism. This may in turn encourage governance by expediency, an inherently unstable political course.
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Liberal constitutionalism assumes democracy. Pro-Beijing and pro-government leaders in Hong Kong frequently worry that democracy poses a risk to
stability. The opposite may be true in Hong Kong. The lack of democracy in
Hong Kong's liberal constitutional system may pose the greatest risk to stability,
as the government veers from crisis to crisis. A system that undermines orderly
constitutional channels for public action may simply encourage greater confrontation and disorder, as well as government by expediency and often by crisis
management. The good news is that, except for direct elections and universal
suffrage, most of the features for fully developing constitutional democracy are
now in place.
Beijing's fear of Hong Kong democrats seems at odds with reality. It is apparent that there are no radical advocates of independence in Hong Kong, nor any
sign of outside political control over local political actors. The democrats thus
pose no real threat to Chinese sovereignty. Change in this attitude has essentially
been confronted by a minority of very unpopular pro-Beijing politicians and business elite who seek to preserve their privileges and the political and economic
advantages they afford. These elites have especially sought to poison the minds
of Beijing officials concerning democrats in Hong Kong. But democracy clearly
does not pose the threat about which these elites worry. Even most of their privileges will likely survive under democratic governance, as business typically does
very well in a democracy. This essentially means that the chief risk of instability
comes from the very Beijing officials and supporters that most often warn of
instability from democracy. A revision of this view would help a great deal.
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